New thinking on diplomacy toward North Korea by Rozman, Gilbert
ASIA’S SLIPPERY SLOPE: TRIANGULAR TENSIONS, 
IDENTITY GAPS, CONFLICTING REGIONALISM, AND 
DIPLOMATIC IMPASSE TOWARD NORTH KOREA
 2014               Joint U
.S.-Korea Academ
ic Studies 
 
 
Vol. 25
 
South Korea’s Triangular Relations
Japan-South Korea-U.S. Relations
Sue Mi Terry
The Seoul-Beijing-Tokyo Triangle: Terra-centric 
Nordpolitik vs. Oceanic Realpolitik
Sung-Yoon Lee 
China-South Korea-U.S. Relations
Gilbert Rozman
Russia, China, and the Korean Peninsula
Valery Denisov and Alexander Lukin
National Identity Approaches to 
East and South Asia
Japan’s National Identity Gaps: A Framework for 
Analysis of International Relations in Asia
Gilbert Rozman
National Identity and Attitudes Toward North 
Korean Defectors 
Jiyoon Kim
Bridging the Chinese National Identity Gap: 
Alternative Identities in Hong Kong and Taiwan
Syaru Shirley Lin
Identity and Strategy in India’s Asia-Paciﬁc Policy
Deepa M. Ollapally
Divergence on Economic Regionalism
Asia-Paciﬁc Regional Economic Integration: 
U.S. Strategy and Approach
Matthew P. Goodman
Japan and Regional Integration Dominoes: 
Golden Opportunity or Another Political Failure?
Takashi Terada
Korean Bridge: Balancing Asian Economic 
Regionalism Between the United States and China
Jin Kyo Suh
China’s Choice: To Lead or to Follow on 
Asian Economic Integration
Zhang Xiaotong
New Thinking on Diplomacy Toward North Korea
South Korea’s Search for a New Diplomatic 
Strategy Toward North Korea; Trustpolitik 
as a Goldilocks Approach?
Shin-wha Lee
What to Do about North Korea
Mark Fitzpatrick
Purge of Jang Song-Taek and its Impact on China’s 
Policy Toward North Korea
Zhu Feng and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga
ASIA’S SLIPPERY SLOPE: TRIANGULAR 
TENSIONS, IDENTITY GAPS, 
CONFLICTING REGIONALISM, AND 
DIPLOMATIC IMPASSE TOWARD 
NORTH KOREA
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF: 
GILBERT ROZMAN
Vol. 25
2014
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF: GILBERT ROZMAN, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
JOINT 
U.S.-KOREA 
ACADEMIC 
STUDIES
1800 K Street NW, Suite 1010 
Washington, DC 20006
www.keia.org |      @KoreaEconInst 
t. 202.464.1982  
Joint U.S.-Korea 
Academic Studies
2014 | Volume 25
Editor-in-Chief 
Gilbert Rozman 
Princeton University
NEW THINKING ON DIPLOMACY 
TOWARD NORTH KOREA
218   |   Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Introduction
The fundamental question about the purpose of diplomacy regarding North Korea has come 
into stark focus. For a time Park Geun-hye seemed to be redoubling her efforts to find a 
diplomatic path forward to the “taebuk,” which some translate as “jackpot” of reunification. 
These were accompanied by her “peace and security initiative,” proposed to diplomatic 
partners as a blueprint. However much it needed to be jointly clarified, for diplomacy in 
Northeast Asia. Meanwhile, the U.S. position toward North Korea and, notably China, 
hardened. Its diplomacy over two decades toward North Korea was, arguably, directed 
mostly at China, but now doubts had increased that the limited cooperation realized in 
managing North Korea warranted efforts to find common ground with China on maritime 
disputes and on other tense questions, where U.S. allies and partners pressed for a more 
vigorous response. Meanwhile, attention continued to center on how Chinese thinking about 
diplomacy toward the North Korean challenge is evolving. While in the midst of the Ukraine 
crisis Russia is less willing to cooperate with the United States on North Korea and Japan 
has again put a spotlight on the abductions issue by resuming talks with North Korea after 
it allowed a meeting of Yokota Megumi’s parents with a granddaughter, whom they had 
never seen, the center of interest in diplomacy remains fixed on the Sino-Seoul-Washington 
triangle. Any genuine new diplomacy would require joint agreement among two or more of 
these countries that the time was ripe to proceed.
The three chapters of Section IV successively evaluate debates about how to deal with North 
Korea in Seoul, Washington, and Beijing. Shin-wha Lee explains that Park was faced with 
stark realities when she began her presidency at a low point in relations with Pyongyang, 
but at the beginning of 2014 when Kim Jong-un was appealing for creating an “atmosphere 
of reconciliation and unity” she had sought to reinvigorate her trustpolitik as a diplomatic 
strategy, aiming to promote a culture of regional cooperation. Mark Fitzpatrick emphatically 
acknowledges the growing danger from North Korea, but he concludes that diplomacy is 
not meaningless. It can limit the dangers, he says, in combination with other policy tools—
deterrence, interdictions, and also sanctions. Zhu Feng also makes the case for diplomacy 
under troubled conditions. He sees a more proactive Chinese approach: irritated, quiet, and 
more interested in cooperation with South Korea and the United States; yet, hesitant to apply 
the pressure that would make a major difference. Zhu Feng makes it clear that China is in the 
driver’s seat as far as diplomacy is concerned: it has a strategy that prioritized North Korea 
as a buffer state and counted on economic transformation through integration with China’s 
economy, giving China the leverage to press for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks. 
After Jang Song-taek’s purge amid signs that the North is walking away from economic 
cooperation with China, it is not only worried that the economic strategy is failing, but that 
the denuclearization one is also failing.
These three chapters taken together allow us to consider the overlap and disconnect among 
the strategies of the three main actors in diplomacy with North Korea. Until the purge and 
execution of Jang, the impression in the U.S. is that Beijing was pursuing its own strategy 
with limited coordination with Seoul and Washington, although that had increased after the 
February 2013 third nuclear test by North Korea. There was enough encouragement and 
coordination for Barack Obama to agree to sustain his “strategic patience” and for Park 
Geun-hye to detect an opening to pursue her new trustpolitik. Yet, Beijing was disinclined 
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to apply the pressure that many observers deem essential for those strategies to work. For 
a time the situation in North Korea discouraged Beijing, giving it new incentive to expand 
diplomatic cooperation with the other two countries. For a time, Pyongyang had decided to 
be more forthcoming to Seoul, leading it to accelerate its diplomatic activities. There was 
willingness in Washington to continue a wait-and-see outlook with more active diplomacy 
likely as long as Seoul and, especially, Beijing saw hope ahead. Yet, by the spring of 2014, 
the atmosphere had changed. Pyongyang was more defiant. Beijing seemed to be less 
inclined to cooperate with Washington, as bilateral relations deteriorated. Seoul was under 
more pressure to tighten its alliance. Prospects for diplomacy had worsened.
The purpose of today’s diplomacy, as has been the case for many years, is largely to find 
common ground with Beijing to achieve meaningful denuclearization, marked by a reduction 
of tensions with long-lasting promise. Seoul keeps adjusting its mix of carrots and sticks to 
encourage Pyongyang to turn in this direction, but, more likely, to assure Beijing that a new 
combination of pressure and incentives would not lead to regime collapse and a setback 
to China’s geopolitical objectives. Washington has more skepticism, even if it sees little 
alternative to giving Beijing more time amidst the discomfort Beijing is showing over recent 
trends in North Korea. A glimmer of hope is seen in Beijing’s attitude that it will not host Kim 
Jong-un or reward him without a commitment to denuclearization. Thus, closest attention 
centers on how Beijing will respond to the critical juncture before it. Zhu Feng describes its 
policy at present as giving North Korea the “cold shoulder.” He suggests that Beijing will 
walk a fine line, not thoroughly changing its policy by cutting off supplies of oil or food, 
but distancing itself from Kim Jong-un, increasing diplomatic coordination with the other 
two states, and keeping some pressure on Pyongyang while awaiting its next steps. This 
is a formula for continued diplomacy, preparing for future provocative moves, but not for 
optimism that Seoul or Washington’s diplomatic hopes should be raised very high. Beijing 
may lean toward closer coordination, but it will insist on setting the terms for diplomacy 
with the goal of restarting the Six-Party Talks on terms that will bring denuclearization back 
into the picture without allowing room for various other aspirations favored in Seoul and 
Washington to be easily realized.
Zhu Feng’s relative optimism about Beijing’s interest in new and coordinated policy toward 
North Korea appeared harder to sustain in the spring of 2014, as the Obama-Park summit 
intensified warnings to Pyongyang and was met with a vitriolic response. Sino-U.S. relations, 
and Obama, were putting increased pressure on Park to do things that were not welcome in 
Beijing. Prospects for new diplomacy were on hold, as observers anticipated a fourth nuclear 
test by North Korea. Even so, there have been so many ups and downs in diplomacy toward 
North Korea that reviewing the search for new diplomacy from 2013 under Park Geun-hye 
and Xi Jinping, newly in power, as well as Barack Obama, deserves our attention.
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South Korea’s Search for a 
New Diplomatic Strategy Toward 
North Korea: Trustpolitik as a 
Goldilocks Approach?
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With the North Korean nuclear threat still lingering, the international community’s decades-
long effort to bring about peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was in vain. 
Although there were only a few optimistic moments for establishing a peace regime on 
the peninsula, no such mechanism has been created thus far. The Six-Party Talks’ last 
push for a permanent peace regime in late 2007, which was facilitated by the September 
19 Joint Statement and the February 13 Joint Agreement, was as close as we could come. 
Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy of engagement, Roh Moo-hyun’s unreserved outreach 
to North Korea, and Lee Myung-bak’s stern response to the North’s nuclear program and 
provocations all proved to be fruitless to induce changes in North Korea. There seems to be 
no escape from the treacherous repetitive patterns in dealing with Pyongyang. This is the 
sobering legacy that Park Geun-hye inherited from her predecessors.
Park had to begin her presidency facing harsh realities. Even before she took office in late 
February 2013, North Korea launched a series of provocative actions: its third nuclear test, 
another missile test, withdrawal from the 1953 armistice and the non-aggression pact with 
the South, severance of the North-South military hotline, closure of the Kaeseong industrial 
complex, massive cyber-attacks, and numerous rhetorical threats. In September, the factories 
at Kaeseong restarted operations, and Pyongyang made several conciliatory gestures, 
including resumption of the reunion program for families separated by the Korean War amid 
talk of re-opening tours at Mt. Kumgang for South Koreans that stopped in 2008 when a South 
Korean tourist was shot by a North Korean soldier. However, the North abruptly canceled 
plans for the reunions, blaming the conservatives in the South for “throwing obstacles” in 
the inter-Korean reconciliatory process.1 A more surprising development unfolded in early 
December 2013, when Jang Sung-taek, uncle of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, who was 
second-in-command, was suddenly arrested and later reportedly executed. The year ended 
with the lowest expectations for inter-Korean relations.
Beginning the year 2014, Kim Jong-un called for creating “an atmosphere of reconciliation 
and unity” on the peninsula. Seoul replied that it wanted to see action not rhetoric and 
stated that family reunions would be a first step for forging inter-Korean reconciliation.2 
On February 12, the first high-level talks in seven years were held at the truce village 
of Panmunjom, with family reunions, South Korea-U.S. military exercises, and tours of 
Mt. Kumgang on the agenda; however, Pyongyang demanded that Seoul postpone joint 
military drills with the United States as a precondition for the reunions. Seoul refused, 
claiming that the humanitarian agenda should not be linked to military issues. Later, both 
sides agreed that they would suspend hostile rhetoric toward each other and resume the 
reunions despite the upcoming joint exercise. Yet, on March 25, North Korea launched two 
medium-range ballistic missiles. It also harshly criticized Park’s “Dresden Declaration” of 
March 28 on taking Germany’s unity as an example and model for a peaceful reunification 
of the peninsula and laying the groundwork for reunification through economic and cultural 
exchanges and humanitarian aid as the “psychopath’s daydream” and “bits of useless junk.”3 
Indeed, inter-Korean relations have long been a seesaw, with North Korea’s repetitive cycle 
of provocations followed by weak international sanctions and its conciliatory initiatives that 
often ended abruptly with little progress.4
Despite the strained relationship with North Korea during the first months after her inauguration 
in 2013, Park pursued “Hanbando shinroe” (Korea Peninsula trust-building process), putting 
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emphasis on the importance of maintaining dialogue, honoring every promise that has already 
been made, and abiding by international norms. “Trustpolitik” is known to be an expression 
of Park’s philosophy based on historical experience that sustainable cooperation among states 
requires both trust and awareness of the realities of the peninsula and Northeast Asia. In 
addition, the “Dongbuka pyonghwa gusang” (Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative: 
NAPCI) was proposed as a roadmap to carry out trustpolitik at the regional level and shift 
from current mistrust and rivalry driven by “Asia’s Paradox” (strengthening regional economic 
interdependence, which is offset by an escalation in territorial and historical disputes) into a 
new structure of trust-based cooperation and sustainable peace in the region.5 The Park 
administration has emphasized the difference between NAPCI and previous Northeast Asia 
initiatives that were proposed since President Roh Tae-woo in the late 1980s, stating that 
NAPCI intends to promote a culture of regional cooperation through building trust and aims to 
accumulate habits and practices of dialogue and cooperation starting with soft security issues.6
Park’s approach has induced no real change in de facto nuclear North Korea. In fact, the 
North’s pacifying gestures in 2014 (although it still fired missiles and slammed Park’s 
reunification speech in March) compared to 2013 seem not to be drawn from Park’s “resolute 
and principled” management, but are more closely related to the North Korean domestic 
situation. In 2013, the second year of his reign, Kim Jong-un seemed to be desperate to achieve 
real discernible results so as to legitimize the third generation of the Kim family’s dynastic 
rule. Because of this internal situation, Park had difficulties in pursuing her North Korean 
policy. As quoted in a Daily NK interview with a North Korean expert, “North Korea may 
respond better to South Korean policy changes in 2014 as it aims to improve relations with 
the U.S. and China.”7 Recently, Pyongyang has pursued the strategy of “Tongnam Tongmi” 
(setting up a relationship with the United States through enhancing its relationship with South 
Korea) instead of the long-held strategy of “Tongmi Bongnam” (trying to set up a relationship 
with the United States while insulting and refusing a relationship with South Korea).8
Against this backdrop, this chapter evaluates Park’s North Korean policy through the lens 
of both checkered inter-Korean relations and complex regional settings. She advocated 
trustpolitik as an approach to assume “a tough line against North Korea sometimes, and 
a flexible policy open to negotiations other times.” It has the appearance of a “Goldilocks 
approach,” a middle-of-the-road policy, taking no aggressive actions and not being too 
passive or too generous, which is similar to what many say about Obama’s foreign policy.9 
Park’s administration appears to have taken lessons from ineffective policies of her 
predecessors, whether a progressive Sunshine Policy or Lee Myong-bak’s frosty responses 
to North Korea’s “bad behavior” which did not lead to peace and security on the peninsula.
After more than one year of promotional efforts, however, Park’s catchphrases of 
trustpolitik and NAPCI still suffer conceptual vagueness and lack tangible policy 
guidelines. The essence of trustpolitik is subject to some interpretation and criticism for 
not yet having much perceptible content. Also, Park’s Goldilocks approach is subject to 
criticism, as is Obama’s, as unable to take any decisive move in either direction. The 
challenging regional security situation limits Seoul’s strategic freedom of action, making 
its North Korean policy reactive, rather than proactive, and heavily affected by the great 
powers and Pyongyang’s precarious actions, which, as earlier in the nuclear crisis, often 
proved to be beyond a South Korean president’s grasp.10
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 Trustpolitik as Political Philosophy 
and a Policy Tool
Since Park Geun-hye first introduced the basics of trustpolitik in her article in Foreign 
Affairs, “A New Kind of Korea: Building Trust between Seoul and Pyongyang,” in the 
fall of 2011, it has been perceived by many as a rather ambiguous policy concept.11 With 
the launch of her regime, the South Korean foreign policy elite, especially the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA), has been diligently explaining the meaning and significance of 
this concept and converting it into a workable policy platform, making ever more detailed 
policy explanations. According to Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se, trustpolitik is a vision, 
philosophy, and policy by which South Korea, as a responsible middle power, can pursue 
the Korean Peninsula trust-building process and NAPCI.12 This catchword appears to 
presuppose a philosophically driven policy initiative that is to encompass inter-Korean 
and regional affairs all together.
As the name itself suggests, “trust” is the core concept of trustpolitik. Nations, as individuals, 
need to trust each other in order to cooperate together. Though it may sound simple and 
almost self-evident, this is exactly where contending theoretical paradigms of international 
politics differ in their perspectives and prescriptions. Realists are inclined to see the notion 
of building trust among nations as either impossible or implausible, whereas liberals tend to 
embrace it as both feasible and desirable. Minister Yun argues that trustpolitik is “neither a 
utopian idealism that shies away from realpolitik nor a naïve political romanticism.”13
To those who advocate trustpolitik, Park’s North Korean policy is a reasonable combination 
of carrots and sticks. They evaluate the normalization of the Kaeseong industrial complex 
after a five-month shutdown by the North as a tangible outcome of Park’s new policy 
that sticks to a consistent stance, urging Pyongyang to respect international standards and 
norms and abide by its promises, or otherwise pay a penalty for broken promises, which 
is the key element of trustpolitik. It also demonstrates the possibility of a paradigm shift 
in inter-Korean relations because it marks the first time that Seoul has departed from its 
past practice of either easily accepting or helplessly enduring North Korea’s self-indulgent 
behavior. Meanwhile, Seoul’s decision to allow humanitarian assistance to North Korea via 
international organizations such as UNICEF is also in line with one of the central tenets of 
trustpolitik. The policy supports the provision of assistance to the most vulnerable North 
Koreans, such as infants and pregnant women, regardless of the political situation between 
the two Koreas.14
As far as the policy nametag is concerned, trustpolitik seems to echo Roh Tae-woo’s opportune 
and fairly effective stratagem of nordpolitik; however, the two initiatives are readily 
distinguishable. While nordpolitik mainly focused on geopolitically and diplomatically 
encircling North Korea by taking advantage of the dissolution of the communist bloc in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, trustpolitik aims at laying a solid foundation for meaningful inter-
Korean rapprochement as well as regional cooperation. Also, interestingly, there appears to 
be no geopolitical notion or regional focus in trustpolitik. Instead, it is to emphasize strong 
philosophical principles that demonstrate South Korea’s superior moral ground. This is quite 
a departure from her predecessors’ rather grandiose diplomatic slogans.
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In retrospect, during the Cold War period, Korea tried to develop its strategic thought toward 
regionalism, although it was somewhat restrained and distorted. Based on the firm bilateral 
alliance structure with the United States, Korean diplomatic leverage and choices were 
limited in the region’s multilateral process. Its regional strategy was distorted to some extent 
because the primary objective of its foreign policy was to gain relative predominance over 
North Korea in ideological, political, diplomatic, and economic terms. Post-Cold War efforts 
of regional cooperation among Northeast Asian countries have produced mixed outcomes, 
or what Park called “Asia’s paradox,” with growing economic interdependence but little 
political and security cooperation. This reflects the fact that the functionalist approach does 
Table 1. Comparison of South Korea’s Successive Governments’ Regional  
                Initiatives
Presidents Initiatives Major Characteristics
Roh Tae-woo
(1988-1993)
Nordpolitik
Opening to the former communist countries 
and initiatives for inter-Korean reconciliation
Kim Young-
sam (1993-
1998)
Globalization
Advancing outreach to East Asia and the rest 
of the world, with aims to have a positive 
spillover effect on North Korea
Kim Dae-jung
(1998-2003)
East Asia Initiative
Taking initiative in the East Asian community 
building process (e.g. East Asia Vision Group, 
East Asia Study Group), seeking cooperation 
on traditional security issues, and employing 
a top-down approach based on political 
agreements between heads of states
Roh Moo-hyun 
(2003-008)
Northeast Asian 
Cooperation Initiative
Establishing Northeast Asia security and 
economic communities that include regional 
cooperation on non-traditional security 
agendas, and seeking a “balancing” role in 
international relations in Northeast Asia.
Lee Myung-
bak (2008-
2012)
Creative, Pragmatic 
Diplomacy
Strengthening relations with key regional 
powers, promoting conditional engagement 
with North Korea, and enhancing Korea's role 
in the international community
Park Geun-hye 
(2013-present)
Trustpolitik; Northeast 
Asia Peace and 
Cooperation Initiative
Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation 
Initiative. Building trust between the two 
Koreas by striking a balance between 
sternness and flexibility, focusing on consistent 
international alliances against North Korea 
(especially for the dismantlement of the 
North’s nuclear program), promoting a 
culture of regional cooperation grounded in 
trust, accumulating practices and habits of 
dialogue and cooperation starting with softer 
issues, and building trust through concrete 
cooperation projects
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not work well in advancing the regional integration process in this region. Kim Dae-jung 
and Roh Moo-hyun advocated “open regionalism,” assuring that Northeast Asian regional 
cooperation will not be exclusive and discriminatory against countries outside the region, 
but rather play a catalytic role for broader regional cooperation, which embraces the rest of 
the region.15 Yet, their respective regional strategies were considered to be an inward-looking 
protectionist approach in economic terms, as well as heavily associated with their North 
Korean policies.16
During Lee Myung-bak’s administration, dealing with U.S. attitudes toward multilateral 
initiatives such as ASEAN + 3 and the East Asian Summit (EAS), which did not include the 
United States, was an arduous concern in strategic planning to develop regional cooperation. 
As Washington expressed its continued reservations about evolving East Asia regionalism, it 
was difficult for Seoul to disregard its views because of the geopolitical reality in and around 
the peninsula. Lee was eager to promote “greater Asian diplomacy,” through the expansion 
of an Asian cooperative network based on open regionalism. His pledge for reconciliation 
with Japan on the basis of trilateral cooperation involving the United States was an important 
step toward regional cooperation, although his proposal did not come to fruition. Lee’s 
so-called creative, pragmatic diplomacy gave priority to strengthening the U.S. strategic 
alliance, emphasizing its usefulness for Korea’s national interest, and his strategic thinking 
on regionalism could not be developed at the cost of Seoul’s relationship with Washington.17
In comparison, Park has sought a “G-2” strategy of balanced and harmonious relations with 
both the United States and China. While retaining South Korea’s traditional alliance, Park is 
attempting to develop a strategic partnership with China in dealing with the denuclearization 
of the Korean Peninsula and trade. Her administration claims that successful summits with 
both countries were possible due to a mutual sense of trust between the leaders.18 How South 
Korea, a middle power, can position itself well to secure its national interests in the face of 
the rivalry between giant powers is a thorny task. As U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden in his 
visit to Korea in December 2013 stated, “Betting on the opposite side of the United States 
would not be a great bet.” Noticing Seoul’s growing ties with Beijing, he may be reminding 
the Park administration that it wants Korea’s support in Washington’s rebalancing foreign 
policy.19 Given this reality, Park’s NAPCI attempts to reflect on the lessons learned from the 
previous administrations’ struggles for regional initiatives by emphasizing the importance of 
making cooperation projects and dialogues executable and achievable.20
As for the perception of Pyongyang toward South Korean presidents, it seems to have been 
less critical of Park than Lee. According to a preliminary study on North Korea’s media 
content by Martin Weiser,21 peaks in references to Lee in March and July/August 2012 
coincided with military exercises that began in March and August and the celebration of the 
end of the Korean War. Despite the fierce rhetoric in the spring of 2013 and the numerous 
references to the Korean War in August, references to Park remained less frequent. This 
trend in the coverage of South Korean presidents started in mid-2012, before Park took 
office, and might point at North Korea’s willingness to engage the South after only a few 
months of vitriol following the death of Kim Jong-il. This shows that the third nuclear crisis 
was linked by North Korea more to the United States while paying less attention to Seoul for 
a stern response by the UN. Still, North Korea closed the Kaeseong complex at the beginning 
of April, not long after the war rhetoric rose sharply in March (See Figure 1).
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North Korean media paid virtually no attention to Park after her inauguration in February 
2013 and started to mention her more frequently only in the cabinet’s newspaper Minju 
Choson in June and July, dropping again in August. Rodong Sinmun, which has a broader 
domestic audience as the party’s newspaper, included surprisingly few references to her. 
Having criticized Lee immediately after his election, it took a “wait and see” attitude in 
the case of Park. As South Korean-U.S.-Japanese joint naval drills involving a U.S. aircraft 
carrier in South Korean waters heightened tensions with North Korea in October, references 
to Park increased; however, Pyongyang clearly was less critical of her (See Figure 1).
This lesser attention given to Park in North Korean media may not be a surprise, given the 
fact that Lee clearly took a harder line with the North, a policy the United States supported 
at that time, and given Park’s “middle of the road policy.” Yet, Pyongyang’s response has 
been less unforgiving even when Park clearly rejected the North’s requests, such as holding 
the family reunions only after cancelling the Foal Eagle exercises. Arguably, Pyongyang’s 
reaction to Park is somewhat related to North Korea’s memory of her father Park Chung-
hee’s statement of July 4, 1970 that led to an agreement with North Korean leader Kim 
Il-sung, grandfather of Kim Jong-un, as well as to her 2002 visit to Pyongyang to meet 
Kim Jong-il, father of Kim Jong-un. In addition, after a series of violent provocations and 
threats until the first half of 2013, Pyongyang seemed to employ conciliatory gestures and 
policies in order to go forward with diplomatic engagement with Seoul, and ultimately with 
Washington, which is known as the policy of “Tongnam Tongmi.” In February 2014, the two 
Koreas held reunions of families separated by the Korean War, despite the Korea-U.S. joint 
military exercise. Initially, the North demanded a delay in joint military drills until after the 
reunion finished, but the South refused and, in a very rare concession, the North agreed to 
hold the family reunions as scheduled. This raised hopes for improved inter-Korean relations, 
but Pyongyang has increased tensions again by testing short-range ballistic missiles and 
rockets and rejected Seoul’s proposal to hold Red Cross talks to discuss arranging more 
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family reunions in March. Recently, the North Korean media have also noticeably raised its 
criticism against Park, particularly in the wake of the Foal Eagle exercise, a two-month long 
Korea-U.S. joint military drill aimed at improving combat readiness against North Korea, 
and Parks’ Dresden Proposal.
In brief, trustpolitik, whether as Park’s overarching political philosophy or as a policy tool 
that is applicable both to inter-Korean relations and international diplomacy, is based on 
the hope of establishing a community in which members feel a sense of trustworthiness 
with each other. In implementing trustpolitik since she came to office, Park has diligently 
explained her political viewpoint related to NAPCI to other countries. She claimed that 
the trust-building process on the peninsula and NAPCI are mutually reinforcing since 
the regional objectives of peaceful cooperation are to increase common interest and trust 
between the states involved, to offer opportunities for sustained dialogue and shared norms 
to facilitate one country’s understanding of and predictability about another state’s actions, 
and ultimately to foster a favorable environment for peaceful unification of the two Koreas. 
NAPCI is also considered a useful means to indirectly send a strong message to North Korea 
that the international community will respond to any military provocation.22
Still, the Cold War structure in Northeast Asia remains. As the existing bilateral security 
system is pivotal to regional peace and stability, the multilateral regional security system 
should serve as a complement to the current bilateral structure. Given a clear lack of inter-
state trust due to historical animosity, geopolitical complexity, and competitive military 
build-ups, Park’s emphasis on trust among nations is not only pertinent but also imperative 
to regional peace and security. However, given the realist assumption that nations have 
no eternal friends or enemies but only have permanent national interests in international 
relations, promoting a regional sense of sustainable trust among states, as well as managing 
inter-Korean relations based on trust, sounds both naïve and unfeasible. In an opinion poll in 
February 2014, 71.3 percent of 150 experts on diplomacy and security who responded to the 
survey said the Korean Peninsula trust-building process has no practical effect.23
Park in her NAPCI called for the promotion of multilateral cooperation that begins with 
less controversial regional common interests such as environmental problems, cross-border 
crimes, and anti-terrorism. The main objective of NAPCI is to increase the habit of dialogue 
and cooperation in these soft security sectors, which, in turn, would generate a spillover 
effect to more sensitive issues such as arms control, alliances, and historical and territorial 
disputes. Yet, critics argue that it is just an ambiguous goal that lacks concrete and practical 
ways of implementation.24 Furthermore, a functionalist approach envisioned in NAPCI 
appears to not be effective in the case of Northeast Asia, where geopolitical complications 
and urgency prevail, as shown in ongoing Sino-Japanese and Korean-Japanese bilateral 
tensions that have frustrated trilateral meetings. Strengthening cooperation on softer issues 
has not effectively generated necessary conditions for regional peace and security. Rather, 
tensions over “harder” political and military issues have disturbed inter-state functional 
cooperation already under way. Therefore, confidence-building measures on hard issues 
through a political breakthrough at the highest level are urgently required to regain a sense 
of momentum in support of bilateral and multilateral dialogue in the region.
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Challenging Security Environment  
in Northeast Asia
The world has witnessed a power shift in a changing world order, particularly since the 2008 
global financial crisis. Northeast Asia seems to be at the forefront of the transition. China’s 
rising economic power is being rapidly converted to formidable military capabilities and 
diplomatic influence. Japan’s push for achieving a normal state is already causing increased 
friction among the countries in the region. U.S. supremacy in the region is increasingly 
questionable despite the American diplomatic and military rebalancing to Asia.25 The 
economic worries may, to some degree, be fading away, but the geopolitical challenges are 
intensifying.26 In South Korea’s North Korean policy and regional diplomacy, the complex 
and uncertain regional background needs to be carefully considered.
North Korea: Oscillating Behavior Increases Uncertainty
Since the death of Kim Jong-il on December 17, 2011, there has been an apparent lack of 
consistency in North Korea’s behavior, recently even less predictable and more puzzling 
than usual. Last year it took a series of provocative actions and then suddenly went on 
a “peace offensive.” The periodic ups and downs in its rhetoric are now too frequent to 
discern what it wants, let alone what it truly intends to do. Back in February 2012, there 
was cautious expectation that the long overdue promises at the Six-Party Talks might be 
fulfilled step-by-step if the process resumed, as the “Leap Day” deal was reached between 
the United States and North Korea. North Korea had pledged to allow the IAEA inspectors 
to assess and monitor the Yongbyon nuclear facilities and suspend nuclear tests as well 
as long-range missile launches in return for significant U.S. “nutritional assistance.”27 
However, the deal was soon nullified by the North’s declaration that it would test a “satellite 
launch vehicle,” (SLV), then the actual, if failed, launch, and later a more successful 
December launch. In February 2013, just a week before Park’s inauguration, North Korea 
conducted its third nuclear test. Perhaps emboldened, Pyongyang threatened nuclear war 
with not only South Korea but also Japan and the United States. Pyongyang appears not 
to have the capability to actually carry out an attack on the United States, although it 
threatened to conduct a preemptive attack against it and South Korea in response to the 
two allies’ agreement of October 2013 on a new strategy for deterring nuclear and other 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) strikes by North Korea.28 Taking a more positive 
approach, from July 2013, North Korea appeared conciliatory for a time before turning 
more belligerent again.
What caused North Korea to zigzag? 1) China’s persuasion and pressure? 2) North Korea’s 
own economic necessity? or 3) Kim Jong-un regime’s internal power struggle? All three 
causes are intertwined to make coherent policy implementation more difficult. As evidence 
of the third argument, one need only cite the shocking news of Jang Sung-taek’s purge, in 
the aftermath of which, the domestic political situation appears even more complex and 
uncertain. Now North Korea is tightening control over the deeply troubled population 
because it senses that sympathy for Jang would endanger the regime. Mobilization to 
denounce Jang’s crimes reportedly took place nationwide. On the one hand, Kim Jong-un 
has frequently visited military installations to show off his strong grip on the military. 
On the other, Jang’s personal network—including his relatives and subordinates in the 
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party, the cabinet, and affiliated agencies—was arrested. Those in overseas missions 
were summoned back—all subject to varying severity of punishment from execution to 
imprisonment, depending on their degree of intimacy with Jang. These developments are 
indicative of North Korea’s political instability.
In the midst of this purge, Pyongyang relaunched its “peace offensive.” Starting from the 
New Year’s message, it removed harsh elements from its rhetoric and called for improving 
inter-Korean relations and reciprocally stopping slander and mudslinging. Since Pyongyang's 
"soft" gestures have often been followed by major provocations, discussion about how Seoul 
should respond was cautious. The North’s tactics appeared to be an attempt to soften its 
negative image in the United States and elsewhere.29 Seen in the context of its prior zigzag 
behavior, the pattern of provocation followed by conciliation is nothing new.
Recent Trends among the Surrounding Great Powers
There is widespread skepticism among U.S. policy elites about North Korea’s credibility after 
its abrogation of the “Leap Day” deal and the execution of Jang Sung-taek. Few think that 
conditions are ripe for the resumption of denuclearization talks with North Korea, let alone 
for its strategic turnabout. The United States will likely continue to put pressure on the North 
over the nuclear issue while trying to induce China to play a constructive role.30 Though it 
is difficult to determine whether Kim Jong-un’s power basis has solidified, the United States 
continues to keep its eye on the possibility of new North Korean provocations, even as there 
is mounting impatience for action both in the United States and from its partners in the region.
There is little chance for any U.S. reengagement in bilateral direct negotiations with the 
North to succeed. After past failed bilateral attempts, it prefers multilateral negotiations. 
Therefore, it is crucial for Park to strengthen policy coordination with Washington and seek 
together to develop principles for a multilateral approach. She can be confident now that 
Washington will not give Pyongyang the impression that it can take advantage of occasional 
bilateral contacts with the United States to try to drive a wedge between Seoul and it, as was 
the case at the time of the South Korea-U.S. perception gap (and thus policy gap) over North 
Korea under South Korea’s progressive governments.31
As for China, Beijing is inclined to see the purge of Jang Sung-taek as an internal problem 
and take a “business as usual” position. Yet, Sino-North Korean economic cooperation is 
troubled because many Chinese investors reportedly feel uneasy about their prospects since 
many of their North Korean counterparts—mostly Jang’s surrogates—were either purged or 
replaced.32 Also, Beijing seems noticeably irritated with recent developments, wary of losing 
its leverage over the Pyongyang regime. Over the past few years, China’s awareness of North 
Korean affairs, especially internal political dynamics, has been found to be deficient, lacking 
high-level channels with the leadership in Pyongyang.33 While it is clear that neither Beijing 
nor Pyongyang wants to damage their traditional relations, the former considers it essential 
for the latter not to engage in belligerent behavior and worries about the immature nature 
and unpredictability of Kim Jong-un. Though China expects Kim to stay in power for the 
foreseeable future, it also predicts a certain degree of political and socio-economic instability 
to ensue over the course of his power consolidation. Mending relations depends not only 
on whether Pyongyang exercises self-restraint, but also on how quickly and smoothly Kim 
finishes the “house-cleaning” within his leadership.
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Outside observers are closely observing the following issues in North Korea-China relations: 
a Kim Jong-un visit to China, North Korean nuclear and missile tests, North Korea’s 
border control with China, the PLA’s movements in the vicinity of the border area, Sino-
North Korean economic cooperation activities, and Beijing’s strategic calculations about 
Pyongyang. Kim will eventually visit China in restoring the traditional comradeship with 
his country’s only ally in the region, but North Korea is not expected to abandon its tandem 
strategy of simultaneously pursuing nuclear armaments and economic revitalization under 
his monolithic leadership.34 It is, thus, important for Park to continue to keep warm ties with 
Xi Jinping, coordinating her North Korean policy with him, as well as to urge China, as 
North Korea’s major sponsor, to play a greater role in solving the nuclear issue and involving 
the international community.
From Japan’s perspective, North Korea will experience political instability for some time 
due to Kim Jong-un’s unfinished power consolidation, his arbitrary decision-making style, 
and the apathetic attitude of his senior subordinates, who are now instinctively preoccupied 
with self-preservation. At present, there is no reason to believe that Japan has changed its 
policy, which basically aims to comprehensively resolve the North Korean nuclear and 
missile problems, as well as the abduction issue by maintaining sanctions and allowing for 
dialogue. Nevertheless, politicians in Tokyo, especially Abe and those around him, may hope 
to quickly settle the abduction issue rather than merely participating in the painstakingly 
slow multilateral process to produce a comprehensive resolution since he pledged to solve it 
during his term in office. It cannot be ruled out that Japan could try to strike a deal if it were 
to directly reengage with the Kim Jong-un regime. Abe sent Iijima Isao, a special advisor to 
the Cabinet Secretary, to Pyongyang in May 2013 to discuss the abduction issue with Kim 
Yong Nam without careful prior policy consultations with the other Six-Party Talks partners. 
This visit concerned both Seoul and Washington since any sudden progress in a Pyongyang-
Tokyo dialogue would be at odds with the close trilateral coordination on the North Korean 
issue they have sought. Tokyo’s uncoordinated, unilateral approach undercuts hope of 
making a breakthrough in the dormant Six-Party Talks on the denuclearization of North 
Korea. The Korean Foreign Ministry openly stated that Iijima’s visit was “unhelpful.”35
Japan’s bilateral ties with South Korea and China, respectively, have been strained by the 
Abe administration’s increasingly aggressive and nationalistic posture on historical and 
territorial issues. Abe’s comments about Japan becoming a “normal state,” changing its peace 
Constitution, and revising two standing apologies to its neighbors (the Kono and Murayama 
statements) undermine Japan’s standing in the region.36 The United States is concerned about 
the escalating tension between its major allies. North Korea is predictably tempted to take 
advantage of Japan’s unilateral approach in order to drive a wedge between it and its allies. 
Close consultations with the United States are necessary to urge Japan not to act unilaterally.
As for Russia, Putin’s absolute power and keen interest in the development of the Russian 
Far East have not only put a spotlight on a strategic approach to Pyongyang, but also have led 
to the pursuit of joint business opportunities in North Korea. Even after Jang’s purge, there 
is no significant sign of a setback to bilateral economic cooperation with North Korea, and 
Pyongyang reportedly reaffirmed that Russian partners’ investments, including those in the 
Rajin-Khasan joint logistics venture, will not be affected. Although Russian observers say 
that Kim Jong-un needs more time to complete large-scale follow-up purges and generational 
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changes in the party, government, and the military, they are positive about the survival of his 
regime and the health of the bilateral relationship between North Korea and Russia.37 Since 
North Korea is likely to increase contacts with the Russian side in order to reconfigure the 
old northern triangle of North Korea, China, and Russia, there is a possibility of a Kim visit 
to Russia for a summit with Putin, should he find it difficult to visit Beijing first. Therefore, 
it is essential for Park to include Russia in her Northeast Asian regional strategy to address 
North Korean questions, whether nuclear threats, humanitarian issues, or economic reforms.
Trustpolitik as a Workable Goldilocks 
Strategy: What Should Be Done?
Through the catchword trustpolitik, Park has repeatedly expressed her desire to engage 
in the “peace process” for improving inter-Korean affairs, an operable manifestation of 
trustpolitik, which underscores South Korea’s proactive diplomatic initiatives to create 
favorable external conditions as a crucial prerequisite. Trustpolitik can be both a means 
to achieve peace and security on the peninsula and an end goal to be fulfilled by the peace 
process. The Park administration also claims that whereas the policies of past governments 
have gone from one extreme to another, her strategy is a policy of alignment, i.e., neither a 
coercive policy nor an appeasement policy, but rather an effective and balanced combination 
of contending or competing policy options, such as inter-Korean and foreign relations, 
pressure and dialogue, and deterrence and cooperation, while separating humanitarian 
issues from those related to politics and security.
With the possibility of increasing uncertainty and unrest in North Korea in recent months, 
questions have been raised about South Korea’s preparedness for contingency scenarios that 
could include regime change. There have been lots of predictions about political instability 
and regime collapse over the last 20 years, generating plans like CONPLAN 5029, a military 
contingency plan drafted by South Korea and the United States in 1999 for responding to 
sudden change, which was finally developed into an operational plan in 2009.38
Given geostrategic circumstances surrounding the peninsula and the unique resilience of the 
North Korean leadership,39 sudden collapse is unlikely in the foreseeable future, but there has 
been much speculation about how the Kim Jung-un regime would collapse.40 In this regards, 
there has been more discussion about how to prepare for it instead of mere predictions 
about the collapse itself.41 During her New Year press conference on January 6, 2014, Park 
mentioned “tongil daebak” (unification being the jackpot), which generated a hot debate over 
whether it would be a jackpot or crackpot. Due to the enormous economic burden (“tongil 
biyong” unification costs), a growing number of South Koreans have begun to consider this 
long-desired prospect as not only improbable, but also undesirable. Others claim that “bundan 
biyong” (division costs) are equally exorbitant, if not greater, because North Korea’s perilous 
and unpredictable actions have often generated a “Korea discount” in the global market and 
hurt South Korea’s overall image in the international community. Ordinary South Korean 
citizens also do not wish to tolerate any longer the uncertain environment arising from the 
North’s provocations. Meanwhile, Pyongyang charged that Park’s comment was “fueled by 
delusions about unification by absorption.”42
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Considering that the ultimate objective of Park’s peace process and trustpolitik is peaceful 
unification that would be “daebak” not only for the Koreas but for all of Northeast Asia, as 
she said in Davos in late January, there is reason to pursue new approaches to North Korea. 
First, the South’s strategic communications and policy coordination with the United States 
and China are important to prepare for possible scenarios on the Korean Peninsula. For 
this, information sharing with these states and international consensus on handling unstable 
situations are desirable, deepening the ‘2+2’ information-sharing formula between South 
Korean and U.S. diplomatic and military authorities and more actively consulting with the 
epistemic community at the regional level in analyzing North Korea’s power restructuring 
trends and developing indicators for measuring its instability would be instrumental.
Second, independent of North Korea’s nuclear crisis, its human rights problems and 
humanitarian crisis such as food shortages, political prisoners’ camps, and refugee issues 
should be continually addressed on the international stage. The Park administration needs to 
develop strategies for how to take full advantage of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human 
Rights in North Korea, which released its report about "unspeakable atrocities" committed in 
the country and called for the international community's responsibility to protect the North 
Korean people from crimes against humanity,43 the United Nation’s Human Rights resolution 
targeting the North Korean regime, and other international human rights NGO activities. 
Third, the administration should seek ways to effectively build an international consensus for 
the eventual unification of the two Koreas. Employing various Track 1, Track 1.5, and Track 
2 approaches is necessary, although, using direct government channels with China requires 
caution. During 2013, Park had a total of 27 summit meetings, including the ones with four 
great powers, and foreign ministers’ meetings were more frequent. It is important to develop 
follow-up measures based on Park’s linkage of trustpolitik and the peace process to NAPCI.
What I call Park’s “middle of the road policy” needs to be reconsidered for its effectiveness. 
If her North Korean policy takes the safe road of not rocking the boat, she needs to face 
criticism, as Obama has, of being too wary and ineffectual in forging a breakthrough for rocky 
inter-Korean relations. A step-by-step approach towards developing the Goldilocks diplomatic 
strategy in the short and long-term should be clearly presented. The short-term should be a 
stepping-stone approach. In retrospect, there has been a plethora of ambitious and grandiose 
rhetoric in dealing with North Korean problems. To be fair, previous administrations in South 
Korea and the United States alike made considerable efforts to bring about the denuclearization 
of North Korea. However, with a lack of clear understanding about the desirable end state on 
the Korean Peninsula and the methodology to arrive there, they hastily attempted a variety 
of “comprehensive solutions.” For instance, the George W. Bush administration proclaimed 
it was ready to take a “bold approach” to meet what it considered to be Pyongyang’s needs, 
including negative security assurance and economic incentives in exchange for North Korea 
abandoning its nuclear weapons programs in a comprehensive fashion. Policy makers in 
Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington each had their own initiatives, which were varied in name but 
not-so-different in essence—a “package deal.”
Roh Moo-hyun’s “peace regime” and Bush’s “complete, verifiable, and irreversible 
denuclearization” (CVID) are well-known examples. Although the merits of such deals 
should not to be ignored, North Korea’s notorious “salami tactics” proved to be particularly 
tricky to overcome. The Lee government’s “Vision 3000” was not so different in this regard. 
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When the decades-long effort turned out to be a series of failures, it was clear to everyone 
that a major paradigm shift or a “game changer” in dealing with the North was absolutely 
necessary. Park’s trustpolitik strives to avoid this past pattern.
Longer term planning should be related to preparation for unification, building an international 
consensus for this. North Korean refugees and humanitarian issues should not be put aside. 
South Korean decision makers may have to reconsider their previous “low profile” approach 
to these issues. South Korea can take valuable lessons from German unification, where 
the East German government did not merely change, it collapsed completely from within. 
Purely in order to ease the suffering of partition, the two sides negotiated with one another. 
They did not cooperate with one another, though the West was a dialogue partner for the 
East. Similarly, as reconciliation with the North Korean dictatorship proceeds, a regime that 
gravely represses its people must not be a collaborative partner. A national coalition cannot 
be formed between a free market system and a dictatorship that, at least on the outside, calls 
itself socialist. A unification strategy must be formed from this perspective. In educating 
young South Koreans about unification, the Park administration must acknowledge that the 
regime of Kim Jong-un does not represent the will of the North Korean people. They are 
taking the people hostage, and are not to be viewed as a party for cooperation. In this way, 
the next generation will take an interest in North Korean human rights and democratization.
Conclusion
When new South Korean presidents are elected, it has been common for North Korea to 
make threats and provocations as it tests the new administration, but eventually the North 
takes conciliatory measures that can easily turn into another round of hostile acts. The Park 
administration has been prepared with a sustainable and resilient policy, both in its direct 
dealings with the North and in its close consultations with the international community. 
Nearly all previous efforts to reach an agreement with North Korea have failed to achieve 
meaningful accomplishments because Seoul had adhered to a negotiating principle of 
reaching a collective, comprehensive, and grand bargain, that was countered by North 
Korea’s salami tactics and other strategies to stall progress. Learning from these experiences, 
Park has been trying to build trust between the two Koreas, but with Pyongyang’s continuous 
provocations, her approach has not been successful in achieving its objectives.44
It is therefore better to strive for small but meaningful results in the short term, while also 
building on these achievements to move forward towards the ultimate goal in the mid to 
long term. In order to cultivate an environment for unification, Seoul needs to concentrate 
on cooperating with the international community and building global consensus and support 
for unification, while simultaneously dealing with issues in North Korea, not only traditional 
military issues, but also human rights and humanitarian assistance.
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What to Do about North Korea
Mark Fitzpatrick
240   |   Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
North Korea is the world’s most troublesome country, brutal at home and a bully abroad. 
In 2013 it became even more dangerous, both to its neighbors and to its own people. Most 
worrisome are the nuclear weapons that Pyongyang sees as vital for the preservation of the 
regime. Although North Korea seems intent on never trading them away for economic or 
political benefits, this does not mean that diplomacy is meaningless. In combination with 
deterrence, interdictions, sanctions, and other policy tools, engagement can seek to limit the 
dangers. The policy options for the United States are not new; nearly every policy choice 
short of military preemption has already been tried. What is changed is the set of unfavorable 
circumstances faced by Pyongyang: a pervasive market economy, an increasing flow of 
outside information, widespread corruption, and the exposure of internal divisions that 
reached to the leader’s own relatives. Pressure on Pyongyang that sharpens its policy choices 
also serves a longer-term goal of hastening internal change that can lead to unification.
A Dangerous Regime
The external threats posed by North Korea include progress in both the plutonium and 
uranium paths to a nuclear weapon. Whether the DPRK has “smaller, diversified and precision 
nuclear weapons,” as claimed,1 cannot be confirmed. Nor is it known whether the February 
12, 2013 test, North Korea’s third since 2006, was based on plutonium, as were the other two, 
or highly enriched uranium (HEU). The radioactive isotopes collected in Japan two months 
later had decayed too much to allow a determination. But each test brings Pyongyang closer 
to having a deliverable nuclear weapon.
The North’s current plutonium holdings are sufficient for no more than about ten weapons. 
The 5MWe reactor at Yongbyon which produced that plutonium before it was partially 
disabled in 2007 appears to have been restarted in the autumn of 2013, although North 
Korea has not yet announced this. Resumption of reactor operations will enable it to 
annually add one to two weapons’ worth of plutonium to that stockpile, beginning in two to 
three years when the fuel load is discharged, cooled, and then reprocessed. The facility for 
producing enriched uranium appears to have doubled in size, based on overhead imagery 
of the roof, and new activity is underway on other probable nuclear-related facilities at the 
sprawling Yongbyon complex.2 Construction of an experimental light-water reactor may 
be completed by the end of 2014 or early 2015, giving North Korea another means of 
producing plutonium for two or three weapons a year, although the main purpose is probably 
electricity generation since the plutonium from such reactors is not ideal for weapons use. 
In the summer and autumn, excavation work and two new tunnel entrances were observed 
at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site.3 In late March 2014, North Korea threatened to carry out 
a “new form” of nuclear test.4
Giving legal and political weight to the nuclear weapons program, meetings of the Workers’ 
Party and Supreme People’s Assembly in March and April 2013 decided that nuclear 
weapons possession should be a matter of law and never traded away, and that the nuclear 
and missile programs should be pursued simultaneously with economic development, a 
policy known as the “byungjin (progress in tandem) line.” During the spring 2013 escalation 
of tension following the UN Security Council’s response to the third nuclear test, North 
Korea threatened a “pre-emptive nuclear strike” on the United States and released YouTube 
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clips depicting attacks on the White House and New York City, the latter copied from a video 
game. To drive home the point, North Korea released a staged photograph of leader Kim 
Jong-un in a command center-like setting with a map supposedly showing target sites for a 
missile strike on various cities in the continental United States.
North Korea has no missiles capable of hitting the American homeland, though it is working 
toward this goal. The longest-range missile of known reliability, the Nodong; can reach 
about 900 km with a 1,000 kg warhead. A Nodong variant that was displayed in a 2010 
parade and has striking similarities to the Iranian Ghadr-1 might extend that reach to 1,600 
km, but the operational status of this system is unclear. North Korea has also displayed 
apparent mock-ups of two longer-range missiles that it has never tested. In April 2013, it 
deployed two road-mobile Musudan missiles to the East Coast, but whether it ever intended 
to test them or only to use them for political signaling is unclear. The United States estimates 
that the Musudan has a potential range of 4,000 km, which would put Guam in reach. The 
maximum range, however, may be closer to the 2,400 km of the Soviet R-27 system on 
which it was apparently based.5
Prototypes of another road-mobile system, designated Hwasong-13 by North Korea 
and KN-08 by the U.S. military, were paraded in April 2012 and July 2013. The U.S. 
Department of Defense assesses that they have a range of more than 5,500 km and would 
be capable of hitting much of the continental United States “if successfully designed and 
developed” but notes that, like the Musudan, their current reliability is low because they 
have not been flight-tested.6 Non-governmental Western experts are divided as to whether 
the mock-ups represent real systems. Germans Marcus Schiller and Robert Schmucker 
believe the systems displayed are technically infeasible.7 Americans Jeffrey Lewis and 
John Schilling contend that the mock-ups are consistent with a development program 
for an intercontinental ballistic missile and argue that the space launch that North Korea 
successfully carried out in December 2012 was almost as technically challenging as an 
ICBM launch.8 The 100-kg satellite put into (dysfunctional) orbit by the three-stage Unha-
3 is ten times lighter than a nuclear warhead, and the space launch did not test atmospheric 
re-entry. Until North Korea successfully tests re-entry of a dummy nuclear warhead, it can 
be argued that it does not have a reliable nuclear strike capability. Lewis cautions analysts 
not to be too sanguine on this point, noting that China tested a missile-delivered warhead 
in 1966 with its fourth test and ultimately solved engineering challenges related to re-entry 
vehicles for intercontinental ballistic missiles by 1980.9 Further missile developments can 
be expected in 2014, drawing on the successful Unha-3 launch and the reports of five 
static engine tests in 2013, which might have been for the Hwasong-13, although this is 
unknowable.10 The main launch site at Sohae has been expanded to allow for launches of 
rockets almost 70 percent longer than the Unha-3.11
North Korea’s missile systems can also be used to deliver chemical weapons far afield, although 
artillery is a more effective means of chemical warfare. With Syria’s decision in 2013 to give 
up its chemical weapons, North Korea became the only country presumed to have an active 
chemical weapons program. Testimony from defectors and other evidence give South Korea 
reason to estimate that the North has 2,500-5,000 tons of chemical agents,12 which would be 
two to four times the size of Syria’s former stockpile. North Korea’s chemical weapons are 
thought to include sulfur mustard, chlorine, phosgene, sarin, and V-agents.13 Over the past 
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decade there have been several unconfirmed reports of North Korean assistance to Syria’s 
chemical weapons program,14 which came close to being corroborated in April 2013 when 
Turkey detained a Liberian vessel en route to Syria from North Korea that was found to be 
carrying a number of gas masks in addition to small arms and ammunition.15
North Korea had also assisted Syria’s misbegotten pursuit of a nuclear weapons program, 
an effort that was abruptly halted in September 2007 by Israel’s bombing of the plutonium-
production reactor at Al Kibar. North Korea may also have cooperated with Iran’s illicit 
nuclear program, although the evidence remains too sketchy to allow conclusions to be 
drawn.16 Similarly, there was reason to believe that North Korea may have been engaged 
in nuclear cooperation with Burma; Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said as much in an 
interview in 2009.17 Whatever assistance North Korea was providing to it in the nuclear and 
missile field has apparently ceased as a result of Burma’s move away from authoritarianism 
and toward engagement with the United States and other Western countries. The drying up 
of North Korea’s markets for unconventional weapons sales is one of the bright spots in an 
assessment of the troubles the North poses.
North Korea does continue, however, to sell conventional weapons in contravention of 
Security Council resolutions. Panama’s seizure of the Chong Chon Gang in July 2013 
provided graphic proof of North Korea’s determination to continue such sales. This is no 
wonder. Military goods are among the few areas in which North Korea has a competitive 
advantage; it is thought to have netted $100 million or more a year from such sales.18
Cyber warfare is another area in which North Korea poses security threats. It is strongly 
suspected of launching cyber attacks against South Korean television stations and banks in 
March 2013, similar to earlier massive denial-of-service attacks in 2011 and 2009. North 
Korea is reported to have a 3,000-person cyber army. The hermit nation has an asymmetric 
advantage in the cyber realm because its governmental and military infrastructure relies on 
computer systems to only a limited degree.
North Korea’s troublesome behavior toward the South in 2013 included diatribes against 
President Park Geun-hye and threats to turn Seoul into a sea of fire. In April that year, North 
Korea abruptly withdrew workers from the Kaesong Joint Industrial Zone, halting for five 
months the most promising form of inter-Korea interaction. Just as Kaesong was coming 
back on line on a reduced scale, the North abruptly refused to permit North-South divided 
family reunions at the height of the Chuseok harvest festival holiday. A reunion event was 
allowed in February 2014, but North Korea refused to regularize such meetings.
North Korea found still other ways to pose problems internationally. In April 2013, it 
sentenced naturalized U.S. citizen and Christian missionary Kenneth Bae to 15 years of 
hard labor for unspecified ‘hostile acts” while he was visiting as a tourist the previous year. 
U.S. efforts to win Bae’s release were rebuffed in August when a State Department official 
was disinvited at the last minute, while Kim Jong-un instead entertained the flamboyant 
former U.S. professional basketball player Dennis Rodman.19 In October, Merrill Newman, 
an 85-year old U.S. Korean War veteran, was pulled off an airplane as he was about to depart 
Pyongyang after a ten-day tourist visit. He was held for a month until he confessed to killing 
North Korean soldiers and civilians 60 years earlier. In January 2014, Bae was put before 
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a ‘press conference’ in Pyongyang at which he confessed to unspecified “anti-government” 
acts and asked for U.S. government help to win his release. The staged event appeared to be 
North Korea’s way of seeking U.S. engagement.20
Even worse than the dangers that North Korea presents externally are the crimes the regime 
commits against its own people. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay last 
year noted that North Korea’s deplorable human rights situation “has no parallel anywhere 
in the world.”21 In view of this deplorable picture, last March the UN Human Rights 
Council established a Commission of Inquiry to investigate violations. After a year-long 
investigation, including interviewing over 320 victims and witnesses, the Commission on 
February 17, 2014, released a report which concluded that the systematic, widespread, and 
gross human rights violations constituted crimes against humanity. Documenting in great 
detail the “unspeakable atrocities” committed in the DPRK, the report said these crimes 
“entail extermination, murder, enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape, forced abortions 
and other sexual violence, persecution on political, religious, racial and gender grounds, the 
forcible transfer of populations, the enforced disappearance of persons and the inhumane act 
of knowingly causing prolonged starvation.” Implying that Kim Jong-un and others should 
be held accountable, the Commission noted that the main perpetrators are officials “who 
are acting under the effective control of the central organs of the Workers’ Party of Korea, 
the National Defence Commission and the Supreme Leader of the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea.” The headline recommendation was that these issues should be referred 
to the International Criminal Court for action.22
Hopes that the Swiss-educated young leader would bring North Korea closer to international 
norms were dashed when the world saw how he dealt with his uncle and former regent, 
Jang Song-taek, who apparently got caught on the wrong side of a struggle over control of 
resources. Jang’s summary execution showed the young leader to lead in the style not of 
Gorbachev but of Stalin. “Kim Jong-Un has picked up where his father and grandfather left 
off, by overseeing a system of public executions, extensive political prison camps, and brutal 
forced labor,” commented Phil Robertson, deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch.23
Policy Conundrum
In the quarter century since North Korea’s quest for nuclear weapons became apparent, the 
United States has tried every possible policy response, save one. There has been engagement 
bilaterally and multilaterally, with talks variously involving three parties, four parties, six 
parties, and eight parties. Sanctions of all forms have been applied. Policies of inducement, 
concessions, disengagement, and threats have all had their day. Lack of consistency can be 
faulted, but not lack of imagination. Nothing has persuaded North Korea to desist from its 
nuclear pursuit. Temporary diplomatic successes, the best of them being the 1994 Agreed 
Framework, have all been reversed through North Korean reneging.24
The one option that has not been applied, military intervention, has been kept on the shelf 
for fear of sparking a repeat of the devastation of the 1950-1953 Korean War. Despite 
atrocious provocations over the years, North Korea has remained immune from U.S. 
military reprisal because its artillery held Seoul hostage. The nuclear weapons that may 
now accompany the conventional artillery reinforce the case for caution but do not account 
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for the reason Pyongyang is not attacked. The reason, rather, is geography. Although a 
U.S. military strike against North Korea remains an ever-present deterrent, the United 
States has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with either nuclear or conventional 
weapons, as it put in writing in September 2005.25
In December 2009, after visiting Pyongyang in the Obama administration’s first high-
level contact with the nation, Special Envoy for North Korea Policy Steven Bosworth told 
reporters “this may be the time to exercise strategic patience.”26 Bosworth’s catchphrase has 
characterized U.S. policy ever since, though U.S. officials say it is not strictly accurate. U.S. 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel explained in 
answer to a question about strategic patience posed at an event at Chatham House in January:
 ...our strategy is not to succumb to impatience. Our strategy is to maintain 
a very solid grasp on the things that we do control and where we do have an 
ability both to shape North Korea’s choices but also to avoid repeating chronic 
mistakes that we have, frankly, made in the past. The essence of those mistakes 
was to put hope over evidence – the hope that this time maybe North Korea 
would mean it...27
To avoid repeating past mistakes, the Obama administration is determined not to return to 
any negotiating table with North Korea until it takes actions to demonstrate a commitment 
to denuclearization. Pyongyang’s statements instead signal the opposite intention: to talk 
to the United States as an equal nuclear-armed state and not to give up its nuclear weapons 
until the United States does likewise.28 Angered by the speed with which Pyongyang violated 
the February 29, 2012 “Leap Day deal,” the Obama team has little interest in trying again. 
Under that deal, in implicit exchange for 240,000 tons of food aid, North Korea agreed 
to suspend nuclear tests, enrichment activity, and long-range missile launches. Although 
the U.S. negotiators made clear that a space launch would be a deal breaker, the definition 
of “long-range missile launches” was not agreed in writing. Sixteen days later Pyongyang 
announced its intention to put a satellite into space on the centennial of founding father Kim 
Il-sung’s birthday. The rocket—and hopes for U.S.-DPRK rapprochement—blew up shortly 
after the launch. Although the next launch succeeded, relations with the United States and 
the rest of the world have gone from bad to worse.
The policy conundrum is that as Washington remains patient, Pyongyang is pushing its 
nuclear and missile program ahead on all fronts. Before long, it will undoubtedly demonstrate 
a capability to reliably mount and deliver nuclear weapons to Japan and South Korea and 
possibly further. As former Deputy Assistant of State Evans Revere put it, “When that 
occurs, it will dramatically mark the failure of years of efforts to end the North Korean 
WMD program.”29 Arguing that the United States and its allies cannot afford to just sit back 
and wait for that day, several private-sector experts advocate renewed engagement without 
preconditions. Frank Jannuzi, Deputy Executive Director of Amnesty International USA, 
for example, says: “The smart choice is to be bold. Engage Pyongyang without delay—not 
as a reward for bad behavior, but because it offers the best chance to gradually influence 
North Korea’s conduct, encouraging it to respect international norms, protect the human 
rights of its people, and abandon its nuclear weapons.”30 After meeting with North Koreans 
in Europe, Bosworth and former Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci argued that: 
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“Whatever risks might be associated with new talks, they are less than those that come with 
doing nothing.”31
“Doing nothing” is not how the Obama administration would characterize its North Korea 
policy, of course. Although it is not talking to Pyongyang, it is sending signals. One signal 
is a strengthened posture of deterrence, which serves at the same time as a means of 
reassurance to America’s allies in the region. In October 2013, the United States and South 
Korea announced a “tailored deterrence” strategy to deter North Korean use of nuclear and 
chemical weapons and other forms of aggression.32 In line with this strategy, U.S. and ROK 
defense and foreign affairs officials took part in the two-day Extended Deterrence Policy 
Committee Tabletop Exercise in Hawaii in January 2014 to explore a range of possible 
alliance responses to a nuclear crisis.33 In February 2014, the Pentagon temporarily added an 
800-person army regiment to the 28,500 U.S. military personnel stationed in South Korea. 
The annual large-scale Foal Eagle joint military exercise was again held in South Korea 
in March–April 2014. Last year, in light of North Korea’s nuclear threats, the Pentagon 
enhanced the exercise by sending nuclear-capable B-2 and B-52 bombers to fly near the 
border and simulate bombing runs as much to reassure the South as to deter the North. 
The United States also bolstered missile defenses in the region. UN sanctions against North 
Korea were strengthened and China was persuaded to more strictly implement existing 
international sanctions.
In return, China has encouraged the United States to return to the Six-Party Talks that began in 
Beijing in 2003. Those talks broke down in 2008 over verification requirements for the partial 
dismantling of its nuclear program that North Korea had agreed to undertake. In September 
2013, Pyongyang sought to reconvene the talks “without preconditions,”34 meaning without 
meeting U.S. demands to recommit to the original denuclearization purpose of the talks and 
to verifiably halt the enrichment and plutonium-related activity. A DPRK diplomat told this 
author bluntly in January that under these conditions, the Six-Party Talks are dead.
This does not mean that engagement with North Korea itself is dead. At least it should not 
be. Washington should find other ways to talk to North Korea. The Obama administration’s 
mantra of “not talking for the sake of talks” has a nice ring to it, but the argument is not 
compelling. Talking is useful for sounding out the other side’s intentions and exploring 
potential shifts. Keeping channels open will stand the United States in good stead in the 
event of a crisis that requires immediate communication. Moreover, talking is cost-free, and 
not a benefit bestowed on the other party. It is the essence of diplomacy. U.S. engagement 
should be aimed at reaching the ear of the leader.35 Although Dennis Rodman is nobody’s 
idea of the ideal envoy, the fact that he is the only American to have engaged personally with 
Kim Jong-un is telling. Engagement should be coordinated with Seoul; the most important 
dialogue channel is North-South. For Pyongyang, the road to Washington runs through 
Seoul. The United States will not abandon its ROK ally or relegate it to a second-tier status 
in negotiations, as North Korea repeatedly suggests.
Last year North Korea sought several times to arrange for informal discussions in the guise 
of Track 1.5 talks in Beijing, Berlin, and London. Some of the American academics who 
joined those talks reported afterwards that there was room to find common ground. The 
idea that Pyongyang wants to be recognized as a nuclear power in diplomatic talks was 
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a “misunderstanding,” the North Korean participants reportedly said.36 They could not 
accept conditions in advance, but their nuclear weapons program would be on the table,37 
including a freeze of the nuclear program, postponement of missile tests, and re-entry of 
IAEA inspectors: in short, a return to the Leap Day deal minus any moratorium on satellite 
launches.38 North Korea, of course, would want food aid on the order of the 2012 deal and 
some political concessions.39
The Obama administration is highly unlikely to pursue a comprehensive deal that does 
not include space launches. To allow space launches after they have been denounced by 
successive U.S. presidents and prohibited by two UN Security Council resolutions would 
be politically infeasible, widely condemned across the political spectrum as rewarding bad 
behavior. There is too much overlap between North Korea’s military-use missiles and its 
supposed space exploration. After successfully recovering the front section of the Unha-3 
rocket, South Korea concluded that it was designed to accommodate a nuclear warhead.
So, what is there to talk about? Jannuzi’s suggestion for a Helsinki-like initiative to build 
multiple bridges of discussion on a broad number of topics including energy security, health 
policy, the rights of women and the disabled, etc.40 is breathtakingly ambitious. He is under 
no illusions about North Korean sincerity with regard to denuclearization. In Jannuzi’s view, 
a multilateral process of engagement is first needed to bring about fundamental changes in 
thinking. The idea is akin to the “Sunshine Policy” that won President Kim Dae-jung the 
Nobel Peace Prize in 2000 and was continued by his successor Roh Moo-hyun. The no-
strings attached assistance provided to North Korea under the Sunshine Policy contributed 
to a conservative political backlash in South Korea because it failed to elicit any reciprocity 
from Pyongyang regarding reducing the nuclear program or improving human rights. Little 
appetite is likely to be found in either Seoul or Washington for another turn down this road.
There may be scope for discussion of discrete aspects of North Korea’s strategic weapons 
programs. Siegfried Hecker has suggested focusing on “three no’s: no more bombs (meaning 
no more plutonium and no HEU); no better bombs (no nuclear testing and no missile tests); 
and no nuclear exports, though he recognizes that each advancement of North Korea’s nuclear 
program pushes up against his first red line.41 North Korea should also be encouraged to end 
its chemical weapons program and to adhere to the Chemical Weapons Convention. It is one 
of only six states that prevents this treaty from becoming universal. The United States would 
find it hard, however, to give up much in return for incomplete measures that North Korea, if 
true to past form, is unlikely to honor for very long, especially with regard to the verification 
measures that would be needed. Any pursuit of discrete measures must also be done in a 
way that does not signal acceptance of the nuclear weapons program. What it can offer is 
an improved relationship and integration into the international community on condition that 
Pyongyang denuclearize. Secretary of State John Kerry said the United States is prepared to 
sign a non-aggression pact.42 In 2005 it put into writing a promise of no intention to attack or 
invade into an agreement, and could do so again. North Korea could also be offered a process 
leading to a peace treaty to formally end the Korean War once denuclearization is complete.
Above all, the United States can offer to help North Korea escape the contradictions that 
will otherwise spell its demise. If North Korea continues its nuclear weapons development, 
the United States will instead seek to make those contradictions more apparent. Over the 
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past year, policy makers have emphasized that Washington is seeking to sharpen the choices 
confronting the DPRK between isolation or integration.43 Contrary to the byungjin policy 
line of procuring both guns and butter, “there is no scenario in which North Korea can create 
a viable economic future for itself or its people and retain a nuclear weapons program,” 
Russel said in January 2014.44 Sharpening the choices is ROK policy as well. President 
Park said in Switzerland in January, “unless North Korea changes voluntarily, we have to 
create an environment where it cannot help but change.”45 When both governments agreed 
in January to set up a consultative body to assess developments in North Korea, an unnamed 
senior ROK official suggested that the purpose was not just to watch but also to induce faster 
change in the regime.46
A Nation Beset By Contradictions
As a nation, North Korea is beset by contradictions. For a nation that is chronically unable 
to feed itself and is heavily reliant on China for oil, trade, and investment, the self-reliance 
national ideology of juche is a meaningless slogan. Even in several areas away from the 
border, the Chinese yuan is replacing the national currency. The communist system is 
crumbling as market forces take over the economy. The public food distribution system 
never fully recovered after its collapse in the famine years of the mid-1990s. A study of 
defectors found that most of them had derived the bulk of their income in North Korea from 
unofficial economic activity.47 Despite the state’s efforts to regain control of the economy, 
the private markets are there to stay.48 Because the markets are not fully authorized, bribery 
is pervasive. In a ranking by Transparency International, North Korea is tied for the title of 
most corrupt nation on earth.49
Corruption and emphasis on wealth accumulation have strained the ideological 
underpinnings of the state. Rampant smuggling of Chinese radios and South Korean-
origin DVDs and CDs has undermined the state’s control over information. Cognizant 
North Koreans know their nation is far behind South Korea and a far cry from the socialist 
paradise portrayed in government propaganda. Arch North Korea critic Josh Stanton is 
not far from the mark when he suggests that: “poverty doesn’t cause revolutions; jealousy 
does. Class envy is far more dangerous to Kim Jong-un than famine was to Kim Jong Il.”50 
The economic reforms that the state does attempt to implement quickly fall victim to the 
contradictions. The directive of June 28, 2012 sought to incentivize agriculture by allowing 
family units to keep 30 percent of their production and to stimulate industry by giving 
factory managers more freedom. Among other reforms, factories were required to make 
their own production plans and procure their own inputs. The resultant inflationary wage 
increases, supply constraints, and resistance from entrenched forces within the state and 
military created insurmountable problems.51 In another heralded economic reform, North 
Korea in November established 13 new special economic zones. Yet the abrupt closing of 
the Kaesong Industrial Zone and the increased sanctions on North Korea will have scared 
off all but the most risk-seeking of foreign investors. Apart from these new political risk 
factors, conditions such as restrictions on the use of the Internet and inattention to the rule 
of law make North Korea inhospitable to foreign investment. Foreign firms that have made 
an impact, such as the Egyptian Orascom Telecom Holding, which now has two million 
cell phone subscriptions, have had trouble repatriating profits.52 Meanwhile the government 
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allocates scarce resources to non-productive vanity projects such as equestrian parks, a 
dolphinarium, skating rinks, and a ski resort, plus more monuments to Kim Il-sung and Kim 
Jong-il. Yet under Kim Jong-un, less than ten km of new roads have been built.53
North Korea is often called a failing state. Collapse may, indeed, come in the foreseeable 
future, as predicted by Bruce Bennett at RAND,54 or the present progressive form of the 
verb “failing” could stretch out for many more years. It is incorrect, however, to call North 
Korea an economic basket case. Visitors to Pyongyang report an uptick in consumerism: 
more restaurants, cars, kiosks, and cell phones. Women wear more fashionable clothes, and 
a housing boom is visible in the capital. Many analysts wonder where the money is coming 
from. Rüdiger Frank, one of the most astute foreign observers of North Korea, recalls a 
similar pattern of consumer spending in his native East Germany that was untethered to 
changes in economic policy and surmises that the DPRK may be living off its reserves. 
“Once they are depleted, trouble is inevitable,” he notes, adding: “We may be witnessing the 
beginning of the long-predicted endgame for North Korea.”55
Fissures among the ruling elite became glaringly apparent over Jang’s purge and kangaroo 
trial. Foremost among his many alleged crimes was the claim of disloyalty to the state and 
forming a faction to threaten Kim Jong-un’s power. For a state that has unfailingly proclaimed 
absolute unity, this was an extraordinary admission of internal divisions.56 The byungjin line 
is the most obvious contradiction. For countries in dire straits, the policy choice should be 
guns OR butter, not more of both. As long as North Korea maintains its nuclear weapons, 
it will remain cut off from most sources of foreign trade and investment. China continues 
to offer a lifeline, but at reduced levels after the February 2013 nuclear test and subsequent 
provocations. According to some reports, China stopped state investment in free-trade zones 
and froze high-level visits.57 China also began implementing UN sanctions more rigorously, 
releasing a 236-page list of goods denied to North Korea and stepping up inspections of 
North Korea-bound cargo.58 It even went beyond the requirements of the UN sanctions by 
cutting ties with the DPRK’s Foreign Trade Bank and other bank outlets.
The rationale behind byungjin is that nuclear weapons save money by allowing deterrence to 
be sustained with smaller conventional forces. The most militarized country on earth, North 
Korea maintains the world’s fourth-largest army with the world’s 49th-biggest population. 
Defense spending accounts for 22 percent of GDP, a huge drain on resources. The state 
apparently wants to redeploy some of its forces to economically productive activities. 
Indeed, this is already underway as soldiers are put to work in agriculture,59 but whether 
military spending is being cut cannot be confirmed.
Conclusion
The argument is made that if only the United States would stop its hostile policy and halt 
large-scale military exercises, the DPRK would be able to relax its guard and lower its 
military spending. These exercises are necessary, however, precisely because of North 
Korea’s provocations and threatening posture toward its neighbors with nuclear and other 
unconventional forces. Regular exercises are an important means of maintaining deterrence 
and the capability to properly respond to provocations and to quickly defeat aggression 
should deterrence fail. It is all the better if such defensive exercises put pressure on the North 
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Korean regime in ways that intensify its contradictions. It is no wonder that the January 
16 proposal that North Korea made to the South, in the name of the National Defense 
Commission headed by Kim Jong-un, sought a halt to those exercises.60
One should not be sanguine about the turmoil that would be unleashed by implosion of the 
North Korean state. Bennett’s 2013 study amply lays out the tremendous human, political, 
and security problems that would ensue. There is every reason to hope that the collapse 
will come about with a soft, rather than hard, landing. Peter Hayes, among others, makes a 
reasonable argument for seeking to transform the DPRK “inside-out” via engagement aimed 
at non-collapse.61 This, in effect, is the consistent policy of China, which is wary of turmoil 
on its northeast border and fears that U.S. policy aims at regime change. But those who prop 
up the North Korean state prolong the suffering of its population, and the longer unification 
is forestalled, the harder it will be to knit together the divergent Koreas.
The United States is genuinely in favor of Korean unification that would remove the 
greatest and most longstanding threat to regional security. Unification as a democratic, 
free-enterprise-based republic free of nuclear weapons would be a happy ending indeed to 
the long-running North Korean tragedy.62 Washington does not seek to overthrow the Kim 
regime, nor should it. Yet the United States can help to foster the internal conditions that can 
lead to a regime change, including by promoting a greater flow of information to the people 
about the regime’s human rights record and other failings. Washington is already doing this 
through Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and independent broadcasters in South Korea.
Sanctions will be further strengthened if North Korea conducts another nuclear test or 
long-range missile launch. In particular, Washington should consider the kind of secondary 
sanctions that have been effectively employed against Iran. It is absurd that far tougher 
sanctions have been imposed on Iran even though North Korea’s record of nuclear non-
proliferation treaty and human rights violations is far worse. Third parties that do business 
with North Korean entities involved in illicit nuclear or missile programs should themselves 
face penalties. Any foreign banks that provide financial services for blacklisted North Korean 
entities should face the threat of being declared an institute of “primary money laundering 
concern” as was applied against Banco Delta Asia in Macao in 2005.
U.S. officials insist that the policy of sharpening North Korea’s choices is intended to persuade 
it to give up its nuclear weapons. Privately, most of them would agree with the dominant 
mood in the analytical community that North Korea will not willfully make that decision. 
Officials can never say so, but putting pressure on Pyongyang also serves a longer-term 
goal of hastening an internal change that can lead to unification. The “new” U.S. diplomacy 
toward North Korea is looking to the end game. The goal is not regime change per se, but 
creating the foundation for peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula.
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On December 12 Jang Song-taek, largely considered the second most powerful man in 
North Korea and a well-known “China hand,” was executed for treason and corruption, 
leaving the Chinese government without its most trusted interlocutor and Chinese companies 
without their most important business contact. Jang, who was referred to by the KCNA 
as the “despicable human scum Jang, who was worse than a dog,” was publicly purged, 
arrested, and executed in just four days for “[perpetrating] thrice-cursed acts of treachery 
in betrayal of such profound trust and warmest paternal love shown by the party and the 
leader for him.”1 These salacious, headline-making accusations were likely less shocking 
to Jang’s Chinese counterparts than the fact that he was purged and executed so suddenly, 
threatening their economic plans for North Korea and eliminating their bridge into their 
reclusive neighbor. Jang’s brutal purge presented Beijing with pressing questions and no 
real answers—does China understand Kim Jong-un; can China trust him; and do China’s 
interests still dictate support for Pyongyang?
Jang’s Execution Irritates Chinese Leaders 
and Disgusts the Chinese People
Jang Song-taek’s execution surprised the world and China as well, but how this affects 
China-DPRK ties has been persistently mysterious since then. Even months later the 
implications remain truly hard to estimate, given Beijing’s unchangeable twin concerns 
about North Korea: denuclearization and instability. It is becoming clearer that Beijing 
might be more concerned with the reality that the young leader Kim Jong-un has proven 
to be more inexperienced and less trustworthy than his father. This reality is driving the 
policy balancing in China’s DPRK policy more than its previous sputtering thinking about 
a strategic buffer.
Jang’s brutal purge is a loss for China. As broadly believed, he is a well-known “China hand,” 
dominating most of the trading and economic transactions between Pyongyang and Beijing 
when he was powerful. His execution left China without its most trusted interlocutor for its 
economic counterparts and, perhaps, the trading partner with whom it was arguably best 
acquainted. Beijing’s surprise at Kim Jong-un’s relentlessness was quickly overshadowed 
by the huge disappointment at its inability to know what had previously gone on between 
Kim and Jang. Otherwise, Beijing would have perhaps sorted out some way to mitigate the 
predicament. A few question marks arose shortly after Jang’s execution, and there was no 
way to gloss over them—what is the real nature of the Kim Jong-un regime? Is it possible 
for the regime to take China’s interests seriously? And furthermore, should China’s genuine 
calculus be to continuously support Pyongyang as it is? Obviously, exploring such questions 
has fueled Chinese ire.
Beijing’s official response can be characterized as the “desperation of quietness.” China’s 
foreign ministry spokesman even emphasized that the execution is North Korea’s internal 
affair, and there is no appetite in China to intervene. But China’s real response was a mixture 
of growing irritation and mounting anxiety—irritation at the young Kim for his indifference 
to Jang’s China association, and anxiety over China’s lack of leverage to foresee North 
Korea’s domestic dynamics and, in a timely manner, to react.
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The Xi Jinping administration quickly decided to let the young Kim know of China’s 
irritation. Previously every time there was something big happening, Beijing would 
choose to send a high-ranking official—a special envoy from China’s top leader—to visit 
Pyongyang to inquire in person. Or, an important figure from the North would quickly make 
his way to Beijing, asking about China’s response. Jang’s execution did not elicit any official 
communication between the two sides. The CCP International Department, a long-time 
messenger between the two countries, seems quite idle these days. The irony usually is this: 
there is no possible flow of assistance without the dispatching of a high-level official to 
Pyongyang. Since Chinese Vice President Li Yuanchao visited Pyongyang to attend the 60th 
anniversary of the end of the Korean War military parade in July 2013, the China-DPRK 
official connection has been frozen.2
Jang’s execution immediately attenuated Beijing’s diplomatic passion to pursue its “persuasion 
campaign” to achieve the restoration of the Six-Party Talks. China’s chief representative 
to the multinational talks, Ambassador Wu Dawei, engaged in shuttle diplomacy among 
Washington, Seoul, and Moscow between September and November 2013 purporting to 
persuade the parties to return to Beijing for talks with the DPRK on the denuclearization 
process. So far in 2014, there seems to be little sign that Beijing will work on that “pull-and-
push” policy any longer unless Pyongyang sincerely shows the world community that it will 
use nuclear abandonment to break its self-imposed isolation.
Without Beijing’s bundle of promised assistance, North Korea’s economic situation will 
quickly become desperate. The adverse consequences of Jang’s execution have surfaced 
recently. Because Jang’s followers have been similarly purged, Jang’s business “empire,” 
tangible and intangible, has broken into pieces. Even with the authorization to Prime Minister 
Park Bung-chul to fill the gap, it is most improbable that he could reestablish a massive 
network quickly to replace Jang’s. Therefore, most Chinese business people are not able to 
contact their business partners in the North, and there is no way that they can maintain their 
activities both in the border areas and within North Korea. There is no exact number for the 
moment showing how hard the blow has been for China-North Korea underground trade and 
business, but it is virtually certain that the trading volume in 2014 will register a sharp drop.
Jang’s execution has suddenly resulted in a huge loss of Kim Jong-un’s financial income. 
Jang usually amassed money from his “empire,” and provided funding for the operation of 
a goodly number of political activities and events to show people the benevolence of their 
leader. But with Jang’s execution, the money provided through his network is gone. Kim 
Jong-un must know how it hurts. Whether this adversity will eventually be overcome might 
depend on China’s decision to sustain the survival of the North or just to leave it alone.
Five months after the initial media hype over the motivations and implications of Jang’s 
purge, the full fallout for China-North Korea relations remains a mystery, even to those in 
Beijing and Pyongyang. Exasperated as the Chinese leadership may be, its top priorities 
remain stability and denuclearization, and it is unlikely that Beijing will see this event as the 
tipping point for a new strategic calculus in China-North Korea relations. However, Jang’s 
purge crystallizes Beijing’s belief that Kim Jong-un is more inexperienced, more reckless, 
and less reliable than his father, Kim Jong-il. This lack of faith in the younger Kim is now 
driving Chinese policy more than the previous core belief of North Korea as a strategic 
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buffer. Under this new outlook, China may increasingly rely on threats and pressure rather 
than incentives and reassurances to alter North Korea’s behavior. Furthermore, Beijing may 
be more interested in closer cooperation with the United States and South Korea now that 
Kim has started to directly impact Chinese economic interests and appears willing to gamble 
North Korea’s political stability in his quest for greater personal power.
The Chinese government’s official response has been one of studied calm, but other signs 
point to a surprised and worried benefactor. After the KCNA’s official statement on the 
purge, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Hong Lei said the purge was 
North Korea’s “internal affair” and defended the economic relationship by saying it “serves 
the interests of both sides.”3 Anxiety about China’s lack of intelligence on North Korea’s 
domestic dynamics, reinforced by Beijing’s surprise at Jang’s purge, continues a disturbing 
trend, both for Beijing’s own peace of mind and for the rest of the world—Pyongyang does 
not communicate crucial events to its only ally.4 The surprise at Kim’s brutality was quickly 
followed by Beijing’s disappointment at not being able to foresee and mitigate the impending 
purge of its most reliable advocate within the Kim regime.
Fearing a Domino Effect on  
Trade Relations
Beijing fears Jang’s purge will damage the economic ties it has been steadily building with 
North Korea, jeopardizing its economic interests and possibly Beijing’s behind-the-scenes 
efforts for denuclearization. In contrast to the official line, Chinese commentary in the 
mainland media reveals that Beijing is remarkably concerned for the future of China-North 
Korea economic relations, especially the Rajin port after it was singled out by North Korea as 
one of Jang’s crimes.5 This accusation is obviously targeted at China and suggests that North 
Korea also knew that Jang was China’s man in Pyongyang, and no longer approved. While 
Jang’s China ties may be a cover-up for the real domestic power struggle, the accusations 
could also signal Pyongyang’s intention to reduce its economic reliance on Beijing or create 
negotiating leverage for a more equitable trade relationship going forward. In response to 
this perceived threat to Chinese economic interests in North Korea, one prominent Chinese 
scholar, Central Party School professor Zhang Liangui, even suggested that China should 
rethink its policy on non-intervention.6
Jang’s purge has already affected Chinese traders and investors in North Korea, although 
the true impact may never be known since so much trade goes unrecorded. Since the purge 
extended to Jang’s followers, his business “empire,” largely funded by trade with China, 
has collapsed and Chinese businesses are having difficulty contacting their North Korean 
business partners to maintain normal trade relations. This, in turn, means that the Kim regime 
will be looking for new revenue streams, since Jang’s network funded many of its activities.
Moreover, SIPRI’s latest report on China-North Korea relations asserts that China’s economic 
push into North Korea is part of the Chinese government’s strategy for denuclearization.7 If 
this is true, then Jang’s purge not only cost Beijing its most trusted interlocutor and its biggest 
supporter of Chinese trade and investment, but also threatens its plan for denuclearization. 
Thus, Jang’s purge may force China to change its denuclearization strategy if North Korea 
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walks away from economic cooperation with China. This suggests that despite the Chinese 
government’s nonchalance, Beijing is very worried about the message Jang’s criminal 
accusations were intended to send to China and the potential impact not only on Chinese 
trade and investment with the North but also on denuclearization efforts.
Beijing’s New Approach to the Young 
Leader: A Cold Shoulder
In response to Kim killing China’s inside man, Beijing has adopted a new approach to 
North Korean misbehavior—silence. When North Korea has made pivotal decisions in the 
past, China would either dispatch or receive a senior official—a special envoy from the top 
leaders—to communicate China’s response in person. Yet since Jang’s execution, there has 
been no such official communication between the two sides. Indeed, the CCP International 
Liaison Department has remained idle since political ties were frozen following Vice President 
Li Yuanchao’s visit to Pyongyang. China’s vital assistance will likely not resume until a high-
level official visits either Beijing or Pyongyang; so the onus is on Kim to revive the relationship.
Beijing’s silence has only been broken by a fleeting call for Kim to make his first visit 
to Beijing, likely for what would best be described by American diplomats as a “frank” 
discussion to explain his actions. Following the KCNA’s official announcement of Jang’s 
crimes on December 9, the Chinese state-run media made an immediate overture to Kim 
for a visit to China. On December 10, People’s Daily ran a Global Times editorial stating 
that “China should help bring about Kim Jong-un’s visit to China as soon as possible.”8 
The resumption of talk about a Kim visit reveals that the Chinese government is concerned 
enough to want a face-to-face meeting with Kim, possibly after concluding that no one can 
challenge Kim for power now that Jang is gone. However, it is unlikely he will be extended 
such an honor unless Kim is prepared to come with a necessary concession—a readiness to 
give up North Korea’s nuclear weapons.9
Chinese leaders are quickly growing tired of Kim’s antics and politics. Kim Jong-un’s third 
nuclear test last February and war-mongering threats last March and April outraged Chinese 
leaders. Jang’s execution undoubtedly only increased President Xi Jinping’s abhorrence for 
the young leader, as Xi’s strong advocacy for cleaning up Chinese domestic politics stands 
in stark contrast to the Kim dynasty’s lavishness and malicious personal cult. Xi’s signature 
theme, the “China Dream,” focuses on enhancing the lives of the people, relegating the 
political darkness of North Korea to a bygone era. North Korea appears to increasingly 
realize that its behavior has pushed China farther away, but instead of mending relations 
with Beijing, Pyongyang has turned to other suitors. North Korea’s recent overtures to South 
Korea suggest China’s tougher policy is already having an effect.
Old Strategy, New Tactics?
Beijing may be nearing a critical juncture for its North Korea policy. Although China has, 
in the past, resisted altering its long-term strategic objectives on the Korean Peninsula in 
response to short-term problems, the current recklessness exhibited by Kim over his first two 
years in power may begin to loom as a long-term problem for Chinese leaders as they judge 
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he is not following the acceptable learning curve. Without China’s continued assistance, 
North Korea will likely perish sooner or later, but unconstrained support will enable the long-
stalled nuclear standoff to persist, and there will be no resolution to the growing uncertainty 
inside North Korea. Jang’s execution will not be the straw that breaks the camel’s back, but it 
does serve as a clear signal that continued non-action in support of the North Korean regime 
raises the stakes for the Chinese leadership.
Continuously resuscitating the North notably puts at risk for China not only the effects of the 
long-stalled nuclear standoff, but also the consequences from growing uncertainty inside that 
country. Kim Jong-un’s third nuclear test last February and war-mongering threats last March 
and April outraged Chinese leaders. Jang’s execution forces Chinese leaders to be conscious 
of the higher stakes at risk. Kim Jong-un’s capricious nature compels Beijing to think about 
alternatives that would be instinctively different from previous ones. For example, China’s 
three military exercises along the border with the DPRK in North Korea in less than two 
months, culminating with 100,000 troops from the unit stationed closest to the border, are 
presumably less focused on a scenario of an American military incursion, and more on that of 
the DPRK’s domestic implosion as a result of Kim Jong-un’s mismanagement. Immediately 
after news of Jang’s purge, 3,000 troops from the 39th Group Army under the Shenyang 
Military Region, the region responsible for North Korean contingencies and the Group Army 
stationed closest to the border, exercised near Changbai Mountain. Then in late December, 
the Chinese Navy drilled in Bohai Bay, the waters between China and North Korea. Finally, 
in early January 2014, the PLA conducted a massive military drill, again near Changbai 
Mountain, with 100,000 troops from the same 39th Group Army, among others.10
For his personal popularity Xi Jinping chose to keep the DPRK far away. As long as Beijing 
holds the line on giving North Korea the cold shoulder, the Kim Jong-un regime will 
inevitably have to struggle to change its posture in order to secure its survival. Its recent 
grappling to court the ROK is evidence that China’s policy turn of being tough will, as 
expected, have some bearing. Kim Jong-un might eventually want to visit Beijing to seek 
some lenience; however, it is out of the question that he would be welcome if he only comes 
with empty hands and no readiness to give up his nuclear weapons.
As Kim continues to ignore China’s signs of increased frustration, Beijing is growing 
increasingly comfortable favoring “sticks” above “carrots” to remind North Korea who is 
the patron and who is the client. While Beijing is not considering a change in policy by 
Western standards, namely abandoning North Korea, it is looking to use new tools to better 
manage the relationship more in line with China’s own interests. China’s reaction to North 
Korea’s third nuclear test may have provided the first glimpse of this tactical preference. The 
Chinese government agreed to an unprecedented level of UN Security Council sanctions on 
North Korea and even unveiled unilateral measures, including the Bank of China’s decision 
to end banking ties with North Korea’s Foreign Trade Bank and the Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce’s September 2013 announcement of an export ban on certain dual-use items.11 
One notable change is that Beijing is more responsive to Pyongyang’s bad behavior and less 
trapped in the view of North Korea as a buffer, i.e., China’s North Korea policy is becoming 
more proactive. As long as North Korea continues to be provocative, Beijing will find no 
other option than to bring its policy more in line with the international community.
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Is it Likely that China Will Take a  
Hands-Off Approach to North Korea?
Dramatically, Pyongyang seems to have turned to flattering the Chinese people rather 
than Chinese leaders. A North Korean diplomat published a rare article in Global Times, 
a notorious nationalist medium, to defend its policy of maintaining cemeteries of Chinese 
war dead from the Korean War of 1950-53. DPRK Ambassador Cho openly called at a press 
conference in Beijing for rebuking the United States and the ROK for their upcoming joint 
military drill. What we can imagine is motivating this is Pyongyang’s worry about the drift 
of China away from it, and in trying to pull China back, it is resorting to traditional appeals to 
the “lips-and-teeth” friendship and to the American conspiracy theory. I am deeply skeptical 
how effective such tactics will be given China’s increasing pluralism domestically.
It is quite likely that Beijing will continue to walk a fine line, and it is quite less likely 
that Beijing will thoroughly change its policy course toward the DPRK, i.e., abandoning 
Pyongyang by cutting off oil and food supplies. Actually, it is not realistic to expect China’s 
policy toward the DPRK to embrace such a completely dramatic change given the intensified 
geopolitical complexity in East Asia. Yet, a remarkable change in China’s policy is that it 
is more sensitive to Pyongyang’s bad behavior and less entangled in its previous thinking. 
China’s posture toward the DPRK shows signs of recognizing the need to be forward leaning. 
As long as the DPRK continues to be provocative, there is no way but to insist on a policy 
adjustment more in line with the international community.
For the time being, the challenge is for the United States and South Korea to respond to 
Beijing’s cold-shoulder towards DPRK with a greater effort to find a shared vision. It could 
take the form of three-way consideration of how to deal with the endgame of the Kim Jong-
un regime. The DPRK has never been weaker due to Chinese abhorrence of it.
Secretary of State John Kerry’s visit to Beijing in February 2014 presented an opportunity 
for increased cooperation on North Korea policy as Beijing was giving a cold shoulder to 
Pyongyang. One tangible sign of increased Chinese willingness to move forward on policy 
would be its insistence on persuading Pyongyang to return to the Six- Party Talks without 
increasing the assistance level to its troubled ally. To what extent Beijing would use its 
leverage—cutting off oil provisions and even reducing food assistance—to force the North 
to recede seems uncertain for the time being. One of the obvious misgivings on China’s 
side is that it has no willingness to carry on prominent discussions planning for a North 
Korea collapse scenario with the United States. Diplomatically, Beijing’s current stance 
is to distance itself from the Kim Jong-un regime, and there is no doubt that it would not 
welcome the young leader’s visit until he could show real sincerity for abandoning nuclear 
weapons. Instead, China will lean towards greater unity with Washington and Seoul on 
denuclearization. How to force North Korea to return to the talks remains a big struggle for 
Beijing, unless it is really ready to brandish its “stick.” At least this much is true: Beijing 
has implemented trade sanctions against Pyongyang seriously and firmly since the third 
nuclear test in February 2013.
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